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COMMENTS

A GAME OF HIGH STAKES ROULETTE:
CREDIT CARD COMPANIES CASH IN ON
GAMBLERS' BAD LUCK
MAYA HOFFMAN*

INTRODUCTION

Plastic or cash? The option of using a credit card makes consumer purchasing power easy, immediate, and accessible. For an
example of the power of credit, look at a typical day in the life of
Joe. Joe comes home from a hard day's work. He feels a little
lucky. He decides to gamble and have some fun. Joe turns on his
computer and surfs the Internet for the virtual casino web sites
with which he has an account. From the comfort of his living
room, Joe brings the glitz of Las Vegas to his fingertips. Simply by
typing his credit card number to enter the web site, Joe accesses
the world of high roller stakes. However, before Joe realizes it, he
has blown a lot of dough. After a few visits to the virtual casino,
Joe will not fathom how much money he has lost until he receives
a staggering credit card bill. Joe, with other bills to pay and a wife
and three kids to support, does not have nearly enough money to
cover the debt. Deeply in debt, Joe must file for bankruptcy.
However, filing for bankruptcy because of gambling debts is
complicated. It deals with many factors. Such factors involved
can include the intent of the debtor to repay, the determination of
what debts are dischargeable, and the determination of whether
any evidence of fraud exists.
A debtor who files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code faces possible liquidation of all his assets and
non-exempt property for collection and distribution by the designated trustee to the creditors.1 Under Chapter 7, the debtor is al* J.D. Candidate, June 2000. This Comment is dedicated to the Author's
family for their love and infallible support. Also, the Author would like to
thank Cory Aronovitz (J.D. 1993) for his invaluable guidance during the writing process.
1. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1998) (specifying how payments of claims are to be
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lowed a "fresh start"' by discharging preexisting debts without obligation of future repayments! Dischargeability involves "the release of a debtor from all of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are excepted by the Bankruptcy Code."'
Due to the possibility of discharging of debts, individuals file for
Chapter 7 seventy percent of the time, as opposed to Chapter 13,
which can include the requirement of paying future income to pay
off debts.5
In the past, most bankruptcy courts held that gambling debts
were non-dischargeable. 6 However, due to the sharp rise of legalized gambling in many states, courts are now allowing the discharge of gambling debts. Debtors attempt to discharge their
gambling debts under 11 U.S.C. § 727. 8 Creditors attempt to seek
distributed).
2. The concept of "fresh start" was explained by the Supreme Court in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934):
[o]ne of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to relieve the
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit
him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes. [The] purpose of the act has been
again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as
private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor
who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time
of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing
debt.
Id. at 244.
3. Ellen Drought, Note, Navigating Scylla and Charybdis: In re Briese,
Gambling and Credit Card Dischargeability, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 1323, 1327
(1997).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 463 (6th ed. 1990).
Discharge of debts is a step that regularly follows the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy and the administration of her estate. Through discharge,
the debtor is released from the obligation of all her debts which were or
might be proved in the proceedings, so that they are no longer a charge
upon her, and so that she may thereafter engage in business and acquire property without its being liable for the satisfaction of such former
debts.
Id.
5. Id. See also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPrCY 13-14
(1993); Bankers Cite Insolvency Flaws Finance, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996, at
D6.

6. Alexander L. Edgar & Ellen L. Triebold, High Stakes: Gambling on Dischargeability,AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 17, 1998, at 8.
7. Id.
8. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 727 states the following:
[tihe court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless-..
(3) the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed
to keep or preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, from which the debtor's financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or
failure to act was justified under all the circumstances of the
case;...
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a ruling of non-dischargeability for the debt under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2)(A), which allows the discharge of a debt "for money,
property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of
credit, to the extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
debtor's or insider's financial condition... .' For the purposes of
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), "fraud" refers to "common law fraud
based on an intent not to repay the debt." 1°
For gambling debts, bankruptcy courts look to the debtor's intent to repay the debt." However, proving the fraudulent element
of § 523(a)(2)(A) becomes very tricky for creditors, especially since
a gambler always plays to win." "People gamble with the hope
that they will hit the jackpot and be able to bail themselves out of
dire financial straits. Consequently, when a debtor takes out a
cash advance [by credit card], he usually has the subjective intent
to repay the debt.""
The difficulty in proving fraudulent intent becomes more
complex when the debt is due to Internet gambling. The U.S. Senate is currently debating a bill that would make Internet gambling
illegal in the United States.' 4 The issue of the legality of Internet

(5) the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily, before determination of denial of discharge under this paragraph, any loss of assets or
deficiency of assets to meet the debtor's liabilities ....

Id.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Section 523(a)(2)(C) states:
for the purpose of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer debts
owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $1,075 for 'luxury
goods or services' incurred by an individual debtor on or within 60 days
before the order for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating
more than $1,075 that are extensions of consumer credit under an open
end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within 60 days
before the order for relief under this title, are presumed to be nondischargeable; 'luxury goods or services' do not include goods or services
reasonably acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor; an extension of consumer credit under an open
end credit plan is to be defined for purposes of this subparagraph as it is
defined in the Consumer Credit Protection Act.

Id.
10. Edgar & Triebold, supra note 6, at 8.
11. AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Feld, 203 B.R. 360, 366 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1996).
12. Abigail Gerlach, Note, A Game of Chance: The Dischargeability of
Credit Card Gambling Debt Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), 28 U. MEM. L.
REV. 985, 988 (1998).
13. Id.
14. Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999, S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999).
This Act seeks to amend 18 U.S.C. §§ 1081 and 1084 by prohibiting bets and
wagers from being transmitted over a wire communication. Id. The Internet
Gambling Prohibition Act (also known as the Kyl Bill) states in § 2(b):
PROHIBITION-Subject to subsection (d), it shall be unlawful for a per-
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gambling has important ramifications for the dischargeability of
gambling debts.
Part I of this Comment discusses the eventual acceptance of

gambling by the American public and government, and the incredible growth of the Internet gambling industry. 5 Part I further
discusses the current status of Internet gambling in terms of its
legality.'
Part II of this Comment explains how a court discerns
whether credit card debt incurred from gambling is dischargeable.'" Part II further analyzes what is a dischargeable debt and
why a debt should be non-dischargeable if illegality or fraud is involved.1 8 In addition, Part II discusses how the rapid growth of the
gambling industry correlates with the sharp increase in bankruptcy filings.' 9 Moreover, Part II analyzes how the growth of
Internet gambling will further exacerbate the amount of debt and
number of bankruptcy filings.
Finally, Part III proposes that Internet gambling should be
prohibited and that as a result, Internet gambling debts should be
non-dischargeable. Part III outlines suggestions to reduce gambling bankruptcies.

son engaged in a gambling business to use the Internet or any other interactive computer serviceto place, receive, or otherwise make a bet or wager; or
to send, receive, or invite information assisting in the placing of a bet
or wager.
PENALTIES-A person engaged in a gambling business who violates
paragraph (1) shall befined in an amount equal to not more than the greater ofthe amount that such person received in bets or wagers as a result of
engaging in that business in violation of this subsection; or $20,000;
imprisoned not more than 4 years; or both.
S. 692, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999).
15. See ANTHONY CABOT, THE INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT 11 (Trace Pub-

lications, 1997) (estimating the growth of the Internet gambling industry);
Steven Crist, All Bets Are Off, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 26, 1998, at 85.
16. See Anthony Cabot, Internet Gambling: The Relationship Between Legality and Integrity, 2 GAMING L. REv. 231, 232 (1998) (discussing the possibility of drafting and implementing Internet gambling legislation); Paul S.
Hugel, Criminal Law and the Future of Internet Gaming, 2 GAMING L. REV.
143, 143 (1998); Tom W. Bell, Internet Gambling: Prohibitionv. Legalization
(Testimony) (last modified May 21, 1998) <http://www.cato.org/testimony/cttb052198.html>.
17. See generally Drought, supra note 3, at 1328-35 (analyzing the different
approaches courts use to establish the intent of the debtor).
18. Id.
19. Nancy H. Kratzke & Thomas 0. Depperschmidt, Credit Card Advances:
The Impact on Gambling Bankruptcies, 2 GAMING L. REV. 257, 258 (1998).
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THE FACE OF GAMBLING: FROM BACKROOM PARLORS To
CASINOS AT YOuR FINGERTIPS

The opportunity to gamble legally at casinos in the United
States increased exponentially over the last decade. The relatively
new Internet gambling industry threatens to steal numerous casino patrons due to easy, immediate accessibility from the comfort
of the gambler's home. The legal status of Internet gaming will
determine the success of the Internet gambling industry.
A. Growth and Acceptance of the Gambling Industry
Americans enjoy gambling. 0 In 1996, U.S. casino revenue totaled $22.8 billion, doubling the amount of revenue from the previous four years.21 Thirty-two percent of U.S. households gambled at
a casino in 1996.22 U.S. households made 176 million visits to casinos in 1996, an increase of fourteen percent over the previous
year.23 Estimates in 1998 alone show Americans wagered more
than $600 billion, nearly $2,400 for every man, woman and child.
The growth of the gambling industry is related to the acceptance of
gambling by the American
public and the government as a source
25
of revenue and jobs.

"The disappearance of gambling as a specific ground for denying discharge reflected changing societal attitudes [that] continue today."16 In the eighteenth century, Americans believed
gamblers were sinners, mandating condemnation.2 7 The creation
20. Bell, supra note 16. Bell discusses how Americans have already embraced traditional forms of gambling provided by casinos and other forms of
legal gambling. Id. For this reason, Bell believes that Americans will take
warmly to Internet gambling. Id.
21. Harrah's Survey of Casino Entertainment (last visited Oct. 16, 1998)
<http://www.harrahs.com/survey/ce97/ce97_revenue.html> (Source: Harrah's
Entertainment, Inc. Estimates and State Gaming Control Boards). The survey based its revenue totals from new casino destinations (riverboat casinos,
slot machine gaming at pari-mutuels, Indian reservation casinos, limitedstakes casinos), and traditional casino destinations (Nevada and New Jersey).
Id.
22. Id. <http://www.harrahs.com/survey/ce97/ce97_ visitation.html>.
23. Id. Also, trip frequency among casino patrons increased. Id. Gaming
households made an average of 4.8 trips to casinos in 1996, an increase from
4.5 trips in 1995. Id.
24. Crist, supra note 15, at 85; Bell, supra note 16.
25. See Joseph P. Shapiro et al., America's Gambling Fever, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 1996, at 53 (discussing how the gambling industry provides employment for over one million people).
26. Drought, supra note 3, at 1330.
27. I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law-Update 1993, 15 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 93, 94-95 (1992). Rose delineates in-depth a description of
the history of legal gambling in America, from the Colonial Period to the Wild
West expansion following the Great Depression and continuing throughout the
current decade. Id. at 95-98. He observes that "[t]hese developments mark an
important change in public policy from nearly complete prohibition to grudg-
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of the first Bankruptcy Code reflected the perception of gamblers
by making gambling debts non-dischargeable., In the nineteenth
century, the attitude toward gambling changed." "Gambling came
to be considered a vice rather than a sin, and the gambler was
considered weak rather than fallen."' Today, more often than not,
gambling is seen as entertainment and not a vice, thereby gaining
public acceptance and use by the government as an economic tool."'
Therefore, even though gambling does not necessarily prevent dischargeability of debt, creditors argue that credit card debt from
gambling should be subject to the fraud exception to discharge. 2
In the last ten years, the gambling industry, especially the
casino sector, has exploded in America."3
Today, twenty-four
states have at least one casino located within their borders, and a
total of thirty-seven states have established lotteries. 4 Sixty-two
percent of U.S. adults in 1996 agreed that casino entertainment is
acceptable for anyone." The acceptance and popularity of gambling in America clearly paved the way for support of Internet
gambling."
B. The Rapid Rise of Internet Gambling
Since 1995, when the first web-sites appeared, Internet gambling has turned into an "industry" with billion dollar potential.3 7
ing permission." Id. at 97.
28. Drought, supra note 3, at 1330.
29. Rose, supra note 27, at 94-95.

30. Id.
31. Id. Currently, states utilize lotteries and racetracks to generate significant revenues for the government. Id. at 97.
32. Drought, supra note 3, at 1330.
33. Gerlach, supra note 12, at 992.
34. Id. Prior to 1988, only Nevada and New Jersey had casinos. Id. "Now,
not only do Atlantic City and Las Vegas lure the masses with falling coins and
neon lights, but places such as Tunica, Mississippi; Council Bluffs, Iowa; and

Joliet, Illinois also offer the promise of 'itting it big."' Id.; Joseph P. Shapiro
et al., supra note 25, at 53.
35. Harrah's Survey of Casino Entertainment, supra note 21 (Source: Harrah's Entertainment, Inc./Yankelovich MONITOR). The survey also noted

that thirty percent of Americans in 1996 believed that casino entertainment
was acceptable for others, but not for themselves. Id. Only eight percent of

Americans said casino entertainment is not acceptable for anyone. Id.
Eighty-one percent of Americans in 1996 believed that "[clasino gaming can be
a fun night out." Id. Fifty-two percent of Americans surveyed would favor the

introduction of casino gaming in their local communities because of its benefits
to the local economy. Id. Fifty-nine percent of Americans surveyed said that
"[1]egalized casino gaming brings money into a local economy without hurting
existing business." Id. Finally, seventy percent of Americans surveyed felt

that "[a] casino can be an important part of a community's entertainment and
tourism offering." Id. These figures show that Americans support the existence and growth of the gambling industry. Bell, supra note 16.
36. Bell, supra note 16.
37. Kevin A. Mercuri, Interactive Gaming Policy Briefing, presented at The
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Early gambling sites offered casino-like games that did not require
betting with "real money. ' "S In three years, remarkable advancements in Internet security and speed made gambling on the Internet more viable and, as a result, the industry has flourished. 9
The industry's rapid growth can be attributed to the low cost
of entry and profit margins that surged with the increased volume
of players.' Internet gambling sites are developed and started up
for as little as $135,000, while the cost of maintaining the site remains the same regardless of how few or how many on-line customers the site has." Nearly all types of gambling are now availdog racing, sports
able on the Internet, including horse and
2
wagering, lotteries, and casino-style games.4
In 1997, Internet gambling generated $600 million in revenue."' Analysts predict on-line casinos will have worldwide revenues of some $7.9 billion by the year 2001, $3.5 billion of it coming
from U.S. consumers." However, since the legal status of the
gambling industry in the U.S. remains uncertain, the forecasts of
the industry's growth are quite unpredictable. 0

First International Symposium on Internet Gambling Law & Management,
Nov.11-13, 1997, Washington D.C.
38. Allison Flatt, Staff Briefing On Internet Gambling: Overview of Internet
Gambling (last modified May 13, 1998) <wysiwyg://90/http://CasinoLaw.com/
links/flatttestimony.html>.
39. National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), Gambling On the
Internet: One Year Later at 3, (June 18, 1997).
40. Flatt, supra note 38.
41. Crist, supra note 15, at 90.
42. Cabot, supra note 15, at 9. The predominate types of Internet gambling
sites are virtual casinos and sports wagering. Id. "As of May 1998, there
[were] approximately [ninety] on-line casinos, [thirty-nine] lotteries, eight
bingo games, and [fifty-three] sports books, [along with other] horse and dogracing related sites." Flatt, supra note 38. Already, the industry has experienced mergers and acquisitions, the development of industry and trade associations, and publications. Id. Virtual casinos offer software-based video facsimiles of most casino games. Cabot, supra note 15, at 9. "The most popular
are slot machines, including one creative site that combines science and gambling by having the reel symbols depict various parts of the human anatomy."
Id. Other gambling-related sites exist on the Internet, such as legal casinos
that have home pages so prospective patrons can view the casino property and
learn about its facilities, and amenities. Id. at 10. These sites are popular because federal law prohibits many legal U.S. casinos from advertising their casinos by television, radio, or direct mail. Id.
43. See Sebastian Sinclair, Internet Gambling Report If (last visited Sept.
16, 1998) <wysiwig://ll/http:www.Hotelcasinomedia/com/trace/chapter9.html>
(estimating that in 1997, worldwide Internet casino revenues reached one billion dollars, and that the combined U.S. and Canadian Internet casino revenues reached $603.5 million).
44. Id.
45. See Crist, supra note 15, at 83 (discussing the simplicity of establishing
an Internet casino web site); see also Sinclair, supra note 43, at 8 (highlighting
the recent significant increase in Internet gambling revenue).
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C. Legal Status of Internet Gambling in Limbo
"In the United States, gambling regulation traditionally has
been a state, rather than a federal function."46 Nevertheless, the
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) called for a
federal response to Internet gambling." The Attorneys General
hold the position that the global accessibility of Internet technology does not allow states to address the different policy considerations that have resulted in widely disparate legal and regulatory
gambling schemes. 8
The drafters of current federal gambling statutes expressed
no intention of addressing Internet gambling, but rather intended
to address gambling over more traditional communications mediums, such as telephone lines.4 9 As a result, any attempt to legally
prohibit Internet gambling must be done by applying the current
statutes to the more sophisticated medium of the Internet." The
Senate currently is debating the Kyl Bill, known as the Internet
Gambling Prohibition Act, to address jurisdictional concerns regarding enforcement of various state Internet gaming laws. 1 Proponents of the bill seek to prohibit Internet gambling by amending
the 1961 Wire Communications Act. 2
The Federal Wire Act, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1084, is the federal law most often applied to Internet gambling.53 The Federal
Wire Act prohibits betting or wagering conducted over interstate

46. Flatt, supra note 38.

47. Id.
48. Letter from NAAG to Senator Jon Kyl (Mar. 20, 1998) in Flatt, supra

note 38. The policy considerations of concern include: moral attitudes toward
gambling; basic issues of game integrity; effective consumer dispute resolution
procedures; underage gambling; cash controls to hinder money laundering;
and efforts to treat problem gamblers. Id. For this reason, Florida Attorney
General Robert Butterworth stated that Internet gambling "must be addressed at the national, if not international level." 95 Op. Fla. Att'y Gen. 70
(Oct. 18, 1995). In an unprecedented action, the National Association of Attorneys General recommended that the Federal Government expand its law
enforcement role with respect to gambling legislation, traditionally a state
function. Internet Gambling: Hearing on S. 692 Before the Senate Judiciary
Subcomm. On Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, 106th
Cong. (Mar. 23, 1999) (statement of James E. Doyle, Wis. Att'y Gen.). "The
reason the Attorneys General took this action was that state law enforcement
officials recognize the limitations of traditional concepts of state jurisdiction
when it comes to regulating and controlling gambling on the Internet." Id.
49. Anthony N. Cabot & Kevin D. Doty (co-author), Internet Gambling Report 11, 4 (last visited Sept. 16, 1998) <wysiwyg://lll/http://www.hotelcasino

media.com/trace/chapterl0.html>.
50. Id.
51. The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999, S. 692, 106th Cong.
(1999).
52. Flatt, supra note 38.
53. Cabot & Doty, supra note 49, at 4.
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telephone lines.' The purpose of the statute was to allow federal
officials to prosecute bookies, or anyone who used telephones to accept wagers on sporting events or horse races."
Uncertainty remains regarding the future legal status of
Internet gambling."0 Even if the Kyl Bill is signed into law, the bill
would be difficult to implement. 7 Federal authorities would need
to address certain problems regarding prohibition of Internet
gambling.5"
Internet gambling has created a growing apprehension that
the Internet is an unsafe vehicle to conduct any confidential business transactions. 59 Gamblers placing credit card bets face the real
risk that a computer hacker could steal their card numbers."
Money security problems are heightened by the impossible task of
policing the activity of on-line gamblers.6' Internet gambling lacks

54. Id.
55. Id. Enacted in the early 1960's, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 provides in relevant
part:
[w]hoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly using a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in
the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the
transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers or for information assisting in the placing of these bets or wagers, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1998) This section also mandates that the person be engaged "in the business of betting or wagering." Id. Thus, courts require that a
party be engaged in the "sale of a product or service for fee." United States v.
Barborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 329 (D.R.I. 1981). The courts also require that a
party be engaged in a "continuing course of conduct." United States v. Scavo,
593 F.2d 837, 842 (8th Cir. 1979). "Consequently, where an interactive gambling operator charges the customers for its service, the continuing activities
of the operators will likely constitute being 'engaged in business of betting or
wagering,' thus leaving them open to liability under the statute." Cabot &
Doty, supra note 49, at 4.
56. Anthony N. Cabot, Internet Gambling Report 11, 9 (last visited Sept. 16,
1998) <wysiwyg://108/ http://hotelcasinomedia.com/ trace/chapter7.html>.
57. Id.
58. Scott M. Montpas, Comment, Gambling On-Line: For A Hundred Dollars, I Bet You Government Regulation Will Not Stop the Newest Form of
Gambling, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 163, 171 (1996).
59. See Ilene Knable Gotta & Rebecca R. Fry, Danger May Await Internet
Shoppers, NATL L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at C9 (stating "[a] healthy dose of doubt

and caution are warranted before embarking on a cyberspace shopping [or
gambling] spree"); Montpas, supra note 58, at 171 (noting the security risk regarding computer hackers' ability to steal credit card numbers).
60. Montpas, supra note 58, at 171. Moreover, Montpas explains that "even
if the gambler has a standing account, which is required by nearly all of the
bookmaking services available, the account numbers are just as much at risk
as the credit card numbers." Id.
61. See William M. Bulkeley, Feeling Lucky? Electronics Is Bringing Gambling Into Homes, Restaurants,and Planes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1995, at A7
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any disincentive that would curb gambling beyond one's means because of the lack of any tangible representation of money. 2 Also,
even if Internet gambling became illegal, underage gamblers still
have easy access to the virtual casinos."3
Despite the problems regarding policing the Internet, if online gambling were prohibited, the burdens of Internet gambling
substantially outweigh the benefits.64 In other words, the promises
of increased jobs and tax revenues do not outweigh the social burdens that legalized Internet gambling would create.6 5 For this reason, it is highly likely that in the near future, federal laws will
prohibit Internet gambling.
II. DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBT: ANALYZING THE OFF-LINE
CONSEQUENCES OF ON-LINE GAMBLING

Credit card debt from Internet gambling may be dischargeable, even if Internet gambling becomes illegal. In deciding
whether credit card debt should be excepted from discharge in
cases of actual fraud, courts look to the debtor's intent to repay the
debt, rather than his actual ability to repay.6 The intent to repay
the debt is subjective, not objective.6 ' The problem lies with the
ease in which a gambler can enter a virtual casino and lose large
sums of money." A gambler does not play to lose. Therefore, the
gambler always has the subjective intent to win. 9 Since the gam(discussing how "electronic wagering... is difficult to monitor and may [be]
impossible to control.")
62. Montpas, supra note 58, at 172.

63. Id.
64. Id. at 173.
65. Id.
66. AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724, 732

(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996).
67. See Anastas v. American Savs.. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280,
1287 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that even though the debtor had incurred the

majority of his credit debt for gambling purposes, he did have the requisite intent to repay the debt).
68. See Flatt, supra note 38 at 3 (stating "[t]he easy access of the gambling

with a personal computer may appeal to people who have never before gambled, thereby increasing the number of players, and consequently, the number
of pathological gamblers. It will also provide a new medium to persons who
have existing gambling problems.") Id.
69. See Thomas 0. Depperschmidt & Nancy Hisey Kratzke, Bankruptcy For
Gamblers: The Questions of FraudulentIntent, Dischargeability,and Remedial
Policy in Credit Card Cash Advance Cases, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 389, 398-99
(1997) (describing testimony from Rembert v. Citibank South Dakota, 219 B.R.

763 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996)). In Rembert, the debtor was employed as a factory inspector, earning a yearly salary between $36,000 and $45,000 per year,
depending on overtime pay. Rembert v. Citibank South Dakota, 219 B.R. 763,
765 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996). The debtor used cash advances on her two
credit card accounts for gambling purposes and proceeded to lose between
$18,000 and $24,000. Id. She then had to take out a second mortgage to try
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bler believes she is going to win, she also intends to repay whatever debt she owes through her winnings.70 Thus, the gambler is
in a no-lose situation. Even if the gambler illegally gambles on the
Internet, as long as she maintains that she intended to repay the
amount she owes the credit card company, according to law, her
debt may be discharged.7'
Dischargeability of gambling debts is easily applicable to
Internet gambling. The debtor simply asserts her intention to repay the amount she owes the credit card company to discharge her
Internet gambling debts. Due to increased exposure to gambling
on the Internet and a dramatic rise in the issuance of credit cards
to consumers, bankruptcy courts will continue to see a significant
increase in the number of debtors file for Chapter 7 for gambling
debts.
A. Courts Look to the Intent of the Debtor
A debtor who files for bankruptcy seeks to have a "fresh start"
by release of pre-existing debts through the remedy of discharge. T'

and pay off the debt. Id. Eventually, the debtor filed for bankruptcy in April,
1995. Id. at 768 n.8. The bankruptcy court held that the debtor possessed a
fraudulent intent at the time she incurred the gambling debts and denied dis-

charge of those debts. Id. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan reversed the bankruptcy court ruling as "clearly erroneous." Id. at
765. With regard to intent, the debtor testified that she used the credit cards
for the purpose of gambling, and that she realized the only way to pay for her
losses was through the winnings that she earned. Id. at 766-67. Through the
testimony of the debtor, it became clear that the debtor could not reasonably
expect to repay her credit card debt. Depperschmidt & Kratzke, supra at 397.
The trial transcript from Rembert stated the following:
Q. Judge: And let me ask you this-this important question: At the time
you were borrowing this money for gambling, $18,000 to $24,000 in this
six or seven month period, how did you think you were going to be able
to pay it back?
A. I thought I was going to win.
Q. Do you recognize now that it was not a reasonable expectation on
your part?
A. Yes. I recognized it before now.
Rembert, 219 B.R. 763 at 767 (quoting trial transcript). The debtor also answered negatively to the question of whether she ever took money from Citibank without intending to pay it back. Id. at 767 (regarding testimony from
trial transcript).
70. Depperschmidt & Kratzke, supra note 69, at 397.
71. See AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Harris (In re Harris), 210
B.R. 617, 620 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that debt resulting from credit
card cash advances was dischargeable, even if the advances were obtained for
the purposes of purchasing illegal drugs). The court reasoned that since the
defendant intended to repay the cash advances, the plaintiff failed to meet its
burden of proving that the defendant used the credit card fraudulently, and
defendant's testimony was reliable, the debt was dischargeable. Id.
72. Drought, supra note 3, at 1326-27. "The remedy of discharge is a principal feature of the federal bankruptcy system, as provided in Title 11 of the
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The "fresh start" policy is only available to the "honest but unfortunate debtor."73 Besides assisting overburdened debtors, the
Bankruptcy Code helps protect creditors from fraudulent conveyances.74 "As a result, the right of discharge is not absolute." 7' Even
though fresh starts to dishonest debtors are limited, exceptions to
discharge are narrowly construed in favor of the debtor.6
The creditor has the burden of establishing nondischargeability by a preponderance of the evidence. 77 To have a
debt declared non-dischargeable for actual fraud, the creditor must
prove that:
(1) the debtor made a material representation, (2) the debtor knew
the representation was false at the time of making it, or made the
representation with gross recklessness as to the truth, (3) the debtor
made the representation with the intention of deceiving the creditor,
(4) the creditor justifiably relied upon such representation, and (5)
the creditor sustained loss and damage as the proximate result of
the representation. 8
Bankruptcy courts have difficulty trying to apply these requirements to cases concerning credit card use and actual fraud,
United States Code." Id. Discharge of debts fulfills the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code by providing "a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can
reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of pre-existing debt.'" Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279,
286 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). For
explanation regarding the concept of "fresh start," see supra note 2.
73. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287.
74. Charles G. Hallinan, The "FreshStart"Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy:
A HistoricalInventory and An Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 50
(1986). Even though the Bankruptcy Code provides protection to creditors, the
vast majority of consumer bankruptcies usually result in little or no actual
payments to creditors. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1993) (describing how a
bankruptcy trustee is protected from fraudulent transfers). Section 548
states:
(a)(1) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition,
if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarilyA. made such a transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was
or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, indebted; ....
Id. "Where a debtor has committed fraud under the code, he is not entitled to
the benefit of a policy of liberal construction against creditors." Cohen v. De
La Cruz (In re Cohen), 106 F.3d 52, 59 (3d Cir. 1997).
75. J. Chadwick Mask, Gambling Debts: Should Policy ConsiderationsAffect Their Treatment Under the Bankruptcy Code, 67 MISS. L.J. 323 (1997).
76. Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1994).
77. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287.
78. AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Crutcher (In re Crutcher), 215 B.R. 696,
699 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1997).
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since there is no "face-to-face" contact between the credit card issuer and the debtor."9 The debtor transacts with a third party who
is selling the goods and services, rather than the issuer of the
credit card who extends credit." To further illustrate, the bankruptcy court in Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy)

stated "the cardholder and bank have no personal contact. Consequently, the cardholder cannot be said to have directly represented
anything to the issuing bank [and] the bank has nothing upon
which to base an act of reliance."8' To calculate dischargeability of
adopted four different tests, creating
credit card debts, courts have
2
an inconsistent standard.

The first test is known as "implied representation." 3 Under
this test, "the element of representation is implied from the mere
use of a bank card... [which indicates] to the issuer that the
holder has both the intent and ability to pay the issuer for the
charged purchases and advances."' A slight variation of this theory holds that there is only an implied intent to pay, rather than
the ability to pay for the charges incurred.85 The inquiry is pared
down significantly because, under the implied representation test,
the creditor can establish intent merely by use of a credit card.88
This theory has drawn criticism because it shifts the burden of
proof to the debtor.8 It has also drawn criticism because people
generally rely on credit cards when they lack the present means to
pay cash.88
The second approach that courts follow is "assumption of
risk."" The assumption of risk test involves "charges incurred by
the debtor after the creditor revokes the card or terminates its
use[,] generally mak[ing] those debts non-dischargeable, provided
that a timely complaint is filed in bankruptcy court."90 A credit
card holder does not make any representation merely by using a
79. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 446

(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996).

80. Drought, supra note 3, at 1331-34.

81. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 190 B.R. 327, 331
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (citation omitted).
82. Drought, supra note 3, at 1331.
83. Depperschmidt & Kratzke, supra note 69, at 392.

84. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc. v. Hinman (In re Hinman), 120 B.R. 1018,
1021 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990).
85. Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 84 B.R. 653, 656
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988).
86. Drought, supra note 3 at 1331.
87. Drew Frackowiak, The Fallacy of Conflicting Theories for Analyzing
Credit Card Fraud Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.

641, 646 (Sept./Oct. 1995).

88. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 190 B.R. 327, 332
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
89. Depperschmidt & Kratzke, supra note 69, at 392.
90. Id.

1210

The John Marshall Law Review

[32:1197

credit card.91 False representation occurs only when the cardholder continues to use the card after the bank clearly notifies the
user that his credit privileges are revoked." The court in FirstNational Bank of Mobile v. Roddenberry noted that risk is inherent in
today's credit card economy, and the bank voluntarily assumes the
risk of non-payment until deciding to revoke the card.93 The court
also reasoned that lending institutions calculated non-payment
risk factors into their finance charges.94 The court concluded by
holding that the "voluntary assumption of risk on part of a bank
continues until it is clearly shown that the bank unequivocally and
unconditionally revoked the right of the cardholder to further possession and use of the card, and until the cardholder is aware of
this revocation." 9 The assumption of risk theory represents a minority view.96
"Totality of circumstances," otherwise known as the "objective
test," is the third method courts utilize to calculate dischargeability. The debtors intent to repay can be inferred from the totality
of his circumstances. Under this test, which may incorporate the
"assumption of risk theory," some debts may be non-dischargeable
if the debtor incurs them after the creditor revokes the card.9" The
courts use a list of objective factors to determine if the debtor
committed "actual fraud."9 The totality of circumstances test is
91. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Roddenberry, 701 F.2d 927, 932-33 (11th
Cir. 1983).

92. Id. at 932.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. McKinnon (In re
McKinnon), 192 B.R. 768, 772 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); Frackowiak, supra
note 87 at 644-45.
97. Depperschmidt & Kratzke, supra note 69, at 392.
98. Id.
99. Under the totality of circumstances test, some or all of the following 12
nonexclusive factors discussed below presumably tell a court whether "actual
fraud" exists:
(1) The length of time between the (credit card) charges made and the

filing of the bankruptcy (the shorter that time, the more vulnerable the
debtor is to a successful exception to discharge);
(2) Whether or not an attorney has been consulted concerning the filing
of the bankruptcy before the charges were made;
(3) The number of charges made;

(4) The amount of charges;
(5) The financial condition of the debtor at the time the charges were
made;
(6) Whether the charges were above the credit limit of the account;

(7) Whether the debtor made multiple charges on the same day;
(8) Whether or not the debtor was employed;
(9) The debtor's prospects for employment;

(10) Financial sophistication of the debtor;
(11) Whether there was a sudden change in the debtor's buying habits;

A Game of High Stakes Roulette

1999]

preferred by courts because it does not infer any element of nondischargeability and allows the possibility that pre-revocation
charges could be found non-dischargeable."'
The fourth theory is the "common law," or "subjective" test."'
The common law approach looks to all facts and circumstances of
the debtor to assess intent at the time the debtor entered into the
1
transaction.02
Unlike the former tests, the subjective test does not
engage in a factor-oriented inquiry.' 3 For debtors with a gambling
problem, this theory provides the best opportunity for discharge.104
The keynote case exemplifying the common law approach is
Anastas v. American Savings Bank (In re Anastas)."° The debtor
in this case proceeded to accumulate credit card debt of approximately $40,000, primarily incurred by cash advances taken for
gambling at Lake Tahoe.' The Anastas court held that the debtor
did have the requisite intent to repay the debt, despite the fact
that he amassed the majority of the debt from gambling.'
Even
though the court gave great weight to the debtor's gambling problem, the court reasoned that the debtor's actions were enough to
show intent to repay the debt because the debtor always made the
minimum payments on his credit card.'
The court stated that
"Anastas testified that he always possessed the intent to repay his
credit card debts, but that he had a gambling addiction which led
him to unexpected financial circumstances." 9 The Anastas court
looked to the debtor's specific belief given the nature of his addiction." O The Anastas court did not look at what a reasonable person
would have known, considering that the chances of winning
enough money to pay off the insurmountable credit card debt were
slim.'
The ruling in Anastas is an indication that courts using
and
(12) Whether the purchases were made for luxuries or necessities.
Id. at 392-93 (citing Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 84
B.R. 653, 657 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988)).
100. Depperschmidt & Kratzke, supra note 69, at 392.

101. Id.
102. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 190 B.R. 327, 333
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
103. See Anastas v. American Sav. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280, 1284
(9th Cir. 1996) (examining the debtor's intent while putting aside the debtor's
financial condition).
104. See Murphy, 190 B.R. at 333 (holding credit card debt incurred for gambling purposes to be dischargeable); see also Chevy Chase Bank v. Briese (In re
Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 451 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996) (holding debt was dis-

chargeable despite debtor's extreme financial obligations).
105. 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1996).

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1287.
Id.
Id.

110. Anastas, 94 F.3d at 1287.
111. Id. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy) is another ex-
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the subjective approach provide the best opportunity for discharge,
especially for debtors who are addicted to gambling." 2
Chevy Chase Bank v. Briese (In re Briese), is another example
of a case that held credit card debt from gambling was dischargeable.'
The Briese court explained the necessity of analyzing the
debtor's intent from a subjective perspective, not merely concerning gambling addict cases, but bankrupt debtors as a whole:

ample where the court held credit card debt dischargeable even though the
debt was limited to the debtor's gambling habit. 190 B.R. 327, 333 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1995). In Murphy, cash advances from a credit card financed the
debtor's addiction of sports-betting and stock market investments. Id. at 329.
For a brief duration, the debtor was fortunate enough to repay his mounting
debt. Id. However, eventually the debtor's lucky streak ended and he spiraled
downward into bankruptcy. Id. In holding the debt dischargeable, the court
concluded:
[i]n this case, considering all the surrounding circumstances, the Court
finds that at the time the Debtor incurred the debts at issue he intended
to repay them and believed (however unreasonably) that he would have
the means to do so from his gambling and investments. The Debtor had
for years successfully relied on such "income" to pay off his credit card
debt ....The Debtor did not significantly alter his spending habits in
the months preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition; rather his
betting did not come through for him as it had in the past.
Id. at 334. "The court did not analyze the situation from an outsider's perspective." Gerlach, supra note 12, at 1018. "Rather, it looked to the surrounding circumstances from the viewpoint of the debtor and asked itself what
the debtor believed given the nature of his addiction." Id.
112. Gerlach, supra note 12, at 1017.
113. 196 B.R. 440 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996) In Briese, the debtor was a parttime nurse's aid, supporting her five children and funding her gambling habit
through cash advances on a credit card. Id. at 443-44. By the fall of 1994, she
was $30,000 in debt, which required minimum monthly payments of $800,
more than half her gross monthly salary. Id. at 444. Although deep in debt,
Mrs. Briese paid her bills on time and testified that she would cut up a credit
card upon "maxing out." Id. During the fall of 1994, the plaintiff, Chevy
Chase Bank, sent the Brieses a "pre-approved" credit card solicitation promising a credit line up to $10,000. Id. A credit reporting service provided Chevy
Chase Bank with a list of likely targets for credit card solicitations, which included the name of the debtor. Id. Despite reaching the limit on all their
other credit cards, Mrs. Briese and her husband still applied for the Chevy
Chase credit card. Id. Regardless of the fact that the bank discovered the
Brieses' unsecured debts totaled more than two-thirds of their annual income,
Chevy Chase still issued a credit card to them with a limit of $11,500. Id.
Eventually, Mrs. Briese amassed a $15,000 debt with the intention of winning
money to pay off her previous debts. Id. at 445. Finally, Mrs. Briese dug her
family into such a financial hole that she had to file for relief under Chapter 7.
Id. Chevy Chase contended that its claim of $7,811.05 should be declared nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) as credit obtained through "false pretenses,
a false representation, or actual fraud." Id. Applying the subjective standard
to the facts, the court determined that based on the credible testimony of Mrs.
Briese, she did not act with intent when she obtained cash advances. Id. at
452-53.
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[in many instances... there is likely to be quite a gulf between
what the proverbial 'reasonably prudent person' might consider appropriate and the actual mental state of a debtor teetering on the
brink of bankruptcy. 'Human experience tells us debtors can be unreasonably optimistic despite their financial circumstances. 14
The court in Briese paid particular attention to the influence
of gambling on a debtor's mental state, in reasoning, "[t]he fact
that [Mrs. Briese] subsequently lost all that she had won is not
evidence of fraudulent intent; it only evidences the drug-like power
of gambling upon certain people.""' The court also rejected any
contention that a debt should be non-dischargeable simply because
it was incurred as a result of gambling, despite cases which dismissed the debtor's hope of winning as unrealistic and speculative." Further, the Briese court stated, "[s]ection 523(a)(2)(A) was
not intended to deny discharge to 'debtors who made significant,

114. Id. at 451 (quoting GM Card v. Cox (In re Cox), 182 B.R. 626, 635
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1995)).
115. Id. at 452.
116. Id. at 453. The court cited Karelin v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savs.
Ass'n (In re Karelin), 109 B.R. 943 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) and Chemical Bank
v. Clagg (In re Clagg), 150 B.R. 697 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1993), which both held
that debts incurred by gambling were non-dischargeable because the debtors
had no intent to repay. Briese, 196 B.R. at 453.
In Karelin, 18 months before filing for bankruptcy, the debtor, a compulsive gambler, lost up to $260,000 in various casinos by using credit card
cash advances. 109 B.R. at 945. The Court held that the bankruptcy court's
finding was not clearly erroneous based on evidence that the defendant had no
intent to repay despite her testimony to the contrary. Id. at 948. The bankruptcy court applied the "totality of the circumstances" test and considered
such evidence as:
the use to which Ms. Karelin put the borrowed funds, Ms. Karelin's
knowledge of the consistently unsuccessful results of her more than fifteen years' gambling experience, the loss of her job and failure of her
new business, her large gambling losses immediately preceding the cash
advances, the extent of her assets and the liens she had granted on
them within several months preceding the cash advances, and Ms.
Karelin's business experience and general demeanor on the witness
stand.
Id. After emphasizing that an unrealistic hope of repayment is not in itself
fraudulent conduct, the court concluded Ms. Karelin "could not possibly have
failed to perceive the hopelessness of repaying the resulting obligation." Id. at
947.
In Clagg, the debtor funded his gambling habit through credit cards,
resulting in substantial debt that he hoped to repay through his winnings at
"Lotto." 150 B.R. at 698. The court in Clagg held that "[i]ntent to repay requires some factual underpinnings which lead a person to a degree of certainty
that he or she would have the ability to repay. Mere hope, or unrealistic or
speculative sources of income, are insufficient." Id.
In contrast, the Briese court concluded that Mrs. Briese was not guilty
of fraud. 196 B.R. at 453. The court reasoned that under the subjective test of
intent Mrs. Briese's honest, although "questionable and undoubtedly foolish,"
belief that she could win enough to pay her debts was sufficient. Id.
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albeit patently unreasonable, financial miscalculations,' nor did
Congress single out gambling debts for any particular punishment. " 117 Thus, Chevy Chase Bank
failed to prove the fraudulent
18
intent element of § 523(a)(2)(A). 1
Of the four approaches bankruptcy courts use to measure the
intent of a gambling addict to repay his debt, the subjective test is
the most sympathetic to the gambler, because a debtor's intent is
subjective." 9 However, the subjective test has a flaw that arises
from its "abundant compassion for bankrupt debtors.""' A debtor
can manipulate the court's reasoning quite easily by playing on
the court's emotions.12 ' Also, it is virtually impossible to discern
whether a debtor intends to repay the credit card debt with his
earnings, even if the goal of taking a cash advance is to win the
money back.'22
With the increased opportunity to gamble across America,
bankrupt gambling addicts can further expose the weaknesses of
the subjective intent test. The burden on a creditor to prove the
lack of intention of the debtor to repay his debts is simply too difficult of a burden.
B. Exposure to Gambling Increases Chances For Bankruptcy
"People pile up credit card bills, including cash advances for
gambling debts, and get in over their heads. Then they wipe [their
debt] all out through bankruptcy.""' In 1996, there were 1.3 million bankruptcies."" Between April and June of 1997, a record
367,000 bankruptcies were filed."' With the number of personal
bankruptcies rising to nearly a million and a half within the last
year, the figures indicate
that one in every sixty-eight homes opted
"16
to file for bankruptcy.
The rising number of bankruptcies in America is directly attributable to the proliferation of gambling opportunities." 7 "There
are now 298 counties that have at least one major legal gambling

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Briese, 196 B.R. at 453.
Id. at 454.
Gerlach, supra note 12, at 1019.
Id.
Id.

122. Id.
123. Mary Kane, Bankruptcy and Gambling/Easy Credit Card Access at Ca-

sinos Wiping Out PersonalFinances, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 10, 1997, at
A10.
124. See Bankruptcy, Gambling Linked, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis, Ten.), Aug. 21, 1997, at A2 (describing statistical information regarding
the relationship between gambling and bankruptcy).

125. Id.
126. Mark Preston, Congress Takes Up Bankruptcy Bill, AMERICAN CITY AND
COUNTY, June 30, 1999, at 11.
127. Kratzke & Depperschmidt, supra note 19, at 258.
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facility.., and it does not include.., places where state lotteries
or bingo parlors are available.""
Even state governments have
entered the gambling arena, as evidenced by the recent dramatic
increase in states with lotteries." 9 Many state governments not
only tolerate gambling, but they give it their blessing.1' Government acceptance of gambling can be attributed to the gambling industry's ability to draw revenue and provide employment."' Estimates in 1998 show Americans wagered more than $600 billion.' 2'
Caught up in the wave of the increasingly prevalent gaming
industry is the compulsive gambler, who uses credit perniciously
to the point of insolvency." 3' A University of Minnesota study indicated that one percent of that state's population were "problem
pathological gamblers," meaning that they "lose control and continue gambling in spite of adverse consequences."" If Minnesota's
one percent figure were the same nationwide, it would indicate
that nearly 2.7 million Americans are compulsive gamblers."'
Research suggests that compulsive gambling is not innate,
rather the gambler must first be exposed in some way to the industry.3 ' Consequently, the increased possibilities of exposure to
gambling increase the prospect of growth in the number of compulsive gamblers.'37 One distressful example of this growth potential for compulsive gamblers is found in Iowa.138 In 1989, two years
before the legalization of Native American and riverboat casinos, a
study completed in Iowa revealed that approximately 1.7% of
Iowa's adult residents were compulsive gamblers."9 By 1995, four
years after the legalization of Native American and riverboat casinos, a similarly performed study found that 6.4% of Iowa's entire
population were problem or compulsive gamblers. "
The link between compulsive gambling, increased exposure,
and bankruptcy is heightened when factoring in the use of credit
cards.'4 "More than [twenty] percent of compulsive gamblers have
128. See id. (quoting 143 CONG. REC. H5850 (daily ed. July 28, 1997) (statement of Rep. Wolf, submitting SMR Research Corp. Report)).

129. Id.
130. Id.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See Gerlach, supra note 12, at 991-93.
Crist, supra note 15, at 85; Bell, supra note 16.
Kratzke & Depperschmidt, supra note 19, at 259.
See id. at 259 (quoting 143 CONG. REC. H5850 (daily ed. July 28, 1997)

(statement of Rep. Wolf, submitting SMR Research Corp. Report)).
135. Id.
136. See id. (discussing the SMR study).

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Kratzke & Depperschmidt, supra note 19, at 259 (summarizing 143
CONG. REC. H5850 (daily ed. July 28, 1997) (statement of Rep. Wolf, submitting SMR Research Corp. Report)).

140. Id.
141. Id.
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filed for bankruptcy as a result of their gambling losses.. ." and
that "upwards of [ninety] percent of compulsive gamblers had used
their credit card lines to obtain funds for gambling and then
lost.""' A 1995 Minneapolis Star Tribune study examined 105
bankruptcy filings to which gambling was linked."" The study
concluded that gambling was the cause of 27% of the $4.2 million
of total debt."' Average annual earnings of these debtors were
$35,244, while debts on average were $40,066."4 Although the average was eight credit cards per person, one filer accumulated debt
on twenty-five credit cards."6 The ease of obtaining credit cards
combined with increased exposure to gambling facilities has contributed to the rise in gambling related bankruptcies.
C. Internet Gambling Raises the Stakes Further
When factoring in the ease of obtaining credit cards with the
rapid accessibility of Internet casinos, the resulting combination
could dramatically increase the number of bankruptcies filed.
With Internet gambling, part of the danger lies in the fact that "[a]
person does not have to leave his or her home to play casino
games."" 7 Even though the Internet casino lacks the social and
environmental experiences of a live casino, the Internet does provide a great advantage to gamblers in locations where gambling is
not yet legal or where legal casinos are simply too far from home."8
However, the easier accessibility to Internet gambling promotes
increased exposure to gambling, creating a higher likelihood of developing an addiction. An increase in the number of people addicted to Internet gambling would significantly impact the number
of bankruptcies filed.
Making gambling widely available to everyone with a computer and a modem, and making it available in people's living
rooms, will draw out the general population's susceptibility to
compulsive gambling."' Moreover, Internet gambling, because of
its instant feedback mechanism, is known to addict gamblers
faster than other forms of gambling; thus, sociologists and psychiatrists widely refer to it as the "crack-cocaine of gambling ad142. See id. (quoting 143 CONG. REC. H5850 (daily ed. July 28, 1997) (statement of Rep. Wolf, submitting SMR Research Corp. Report)).
143. See id. (summarizing the SMR study).

144. Id.
145. See Kratzke & Depperschmidt, supra note 19, at 259 (summarizing 143
CONG. REC. H5850 (daily ed. July 28, 1997) (statement of Rep. Wolf, submitting SMR Research Corp. Report)).

146. Id.
147. Cabot, supra note 15, at 17.
148. Id.
149. See Newsline, Internet Casinos Launches On-line Gambling Service,
MULTIMEDIA MONITOR, Apr. 1995 (quoting psychiatrist James Hilliard,
Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Cincinnati).
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diction." 5'
Not only does on-line gambling threaten to increase the number of compulsive gamblers overall, it threatens to change the
demographics of this group.'5 ' Despite state efforts to control access to gaming through strict age or income restrictions, 152 gambling addiction in the United States today is growing fastest
among high school and college youths, a demographic most familiar with the Internet."3
The possibility of an increase in addicted gamblers due to
Internet gaming will not only effect the number of bankruptcies,
but will also have an impact on the American consumer. Because
a vast amount of debt is incurred by credit cards, creditors supplement their losses by increasing interest rates and annual fees.
Not only did the number of bankruptcies rise in recent years, but
also the number of credit cards issued increased dramatically.
D. Credit Card Companies Win the Gambler's Game of Roulette
For the past two decades, there has been a surge in the number of companies issuing credit cards and the number of credit
cards issued." About 460 million people have credit cards at their
disposal, thanks to nearly 9,000 companies providing the plastic.'
In 1992, the number of American families carrying at least one
bank-type credit card (i.e., VISA, MasterCard, Discover) was

150. See John Warren Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling
Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 51, 81 (1994) (urging further study of the gambling industry due to risks of addiction to gambling). An internal memo urged
sponsors of a proposed Chicago casino that "it probably won't be enough for
Arthur Anderson and Northwestern University to develop numbers that are
'credible', although that is the essential first step to take" and that "we must
also use these studies to make a compelling and convincing case for the kind of
jobs that will be created, with an emphasis on their 'quality' and 'career' potential." Id. at 53-55. Moreover, during the eight-month time frame for consideration of the casino, publicized job estimates ranged from 15,000 to
100,000; the alleged range of new tourists fluctuated between an initial estimate of 2.9 million to an estimate of 10.2 million; and estimated tax revenues
increased from $327 million to $644 million. Id.
151. William M. Bulkeley, New On-Line Casinos May Thwart U.S. Laws,
WALL ST. J., May 10, 1995, at Bi (citing Rachael Volberg, President of Gemini
Research, who studies problem gambling).
152. See generally I. Nelson Rose, The Legalization and Control of Casino
Gambling, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245, 267-99 (1979-80) (discussing possible
gambling regulation methods).
153. See Robin Widgery, Warning: Legal Gambling Is a Costly Game,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 23, 1994, at 19 (quoting Howard Shaffer,
Director of the Harvard Medical School Center for Addiction Studies in a discussion on the dangers of gambling to youths).
154. See House of Cards, CONSUMER REP., Jan. 1996, at 31 (discussing the
types of companies issuing credit cards).
155. Id.

1218

The John MarshallLaw Review

[32:1197

48%.156 By 1995, that number had risen to 62%.1"
Median credit limits have also increased recently."' In 1992,
the median limit was $5,400.69 By 1995, the median limit was
$9,000.160 Increasing credit limits were proportional to increasing
credit card debt.'6' The Wall Street Journalreported that in 1988,
outstanding consumer credit card debt was $174 billion."' A decade later, this number nearly tripled.'63 Today, there are more
credit card carriers, higher limits, and heavier burdens.
The rise in credit card use over the last decade correlates with
bankruptcy filings hitting an all-time high in 1997.'64 The number
of personal bankruptcies filed jumped 19%, to 1.34 million in
1997.65 The onslaught of credit card debt and consequent Chapter
7 filings by consumer debtors has led to a swell of complaints filed
Inby credit institutions seeking to protect their interests. 66
creased bankruptcy proceedings reflect the rapid growth of the
credit card industry and its practice of mailing pre-approved credit
solicitations that fill consumers' mailboxes on a weekly basis.'67
Potential customers are tempted by credit cards with no annual
fees, temporary low "teaser" rates, high credit limits, and the option to consolidate their already substantial credit card debt. 6 In
return, banks make huge profits from high interest rates on overdue balances. 69 Ironically, oftentimes, even after accepting the of156. Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Family Finances in the U.S.: Recent Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 83 Fed. Reserve Bull., Jan. 1,
1997 at 17, available at 1997 WL 9638392, at *20.
157. Id.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Fred R. Bleakly, A 125% Solution to Card Debt Stirs Worry, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 17, 1997, at A2 (discussing fears of increasing debt).

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See American Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Filings on Record Pace, Though
Third QuarterFilingsDrop Slightly (last visited Dec. 1, 1997) <http://www.abi
world.org/stats/3rdqtr97pr.html> (containing information regarding bank-

ruptcy filing rates).
165. Id.
166. MBNA America v. Parkhurst (In re Parkhurst), 202 B.R. 816, 820
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y 1996).
167. Id. Consumers are lured by credit institutions to pay excessive rates for
"incentives" such as frequent flier miles and discount rates on cars and long
distance telephone calls. Nelson D. Schwartz & Scott Medintz, Credit Check,
SMART MONEY, Feb. 1997, Vol. IV, No. II, at 112. "People fall in love with the
rewards... these cards wouldn't be successful if people acted completely rationally. But the market for incentives isn't rational-never has been. And the
emotional lift from getting miles or something else assuages the guilt of paying high rates." Id. (quoting a former Citibank official).
168. Parkhurst,202 B.R. at 820.
169. Alan Yonan, FDIC Says Banks Post Record $52.4 Billion Earnings in
1996, W.S.J. Interactive Edition (last visited Mar. 13, 1997) <http://www.wsj.
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fers, consumers find themselves in bankruptcy courts seeking reescalating obligations because they failed to pay
lief from their
70
their debts.

Courts have difficulty trying to assess blame for the many
credit card defaults. Some courts take the position that "casual
and inadequate lending practices" of the credit card industry are
to blame, and therefore, under § 727, bankruptcy debts should be
discharged.17 1 Other courts reason that consumer debtors cannot
escape individual financial responsibility for credit card charges
under circumstances evidencing a near hopeless financial
incurred
72
state.

1

corn>.

170. Parkhurst,202 B.R. at 820.
171. The Honorable A. Jay Cristol, Chief Judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, Memorandum to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (1997) (memo undated). The Judge
opined:
[r]ecent actions of credit card companies seeking to hold their debt nondischargeable on the theory that the debtors' use of a card is a representation of debtors' ability to repay and thereafter non-payment constitutes a fraud which should deny dischargeability, is pure garbage.
Credit card companies are obscene in their reckless issuance of "preapproved" credit without any review or underwriting. They are unconscionable in their greedy lust for profits, charging 21%, 22%, even 23%
interest. (Not many years ago, interest above 10% in Florida was a
crime of usury). 11 U.S.C. § 523 should be amended to provide that any
credit extended, pre-approved, without request, and without submission
of a financial statement, should be fully dischargeable in every instance.
Id. (attaching AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Ramirez (In re Ramirez),
184 B.R. 859 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) and AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp.
v. Valdes (In re Valdes), 1995 WL 619001 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)).
172. See, e.g., Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc. v. Hinman (In re Hinman), 120
B.R. 1018 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990) (holding in favor of the creditor). The Honorable William A. Hill, Judge for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of North Dakota, reasoned:
[t]here are some who place blame for credit card defaults upon the industry and the seeming cavalier manner in which cards are issued to
nearly anyone. While the industry may well be far too lax in its card issuance policies, this court does not believe that policy should in any respect lessen the degree of individual financial responsibility to be imposed upon credit card consumers. It is not the issuance or even
possession of a card which results in the incredible number of credit
card driven consumer bankruptcies. Rather, it is the unbridled and irresponsible use of credit by people who either have no cash flow consciousness in the first place, or who conveniently leave it at the curb
side when entering a retail establishment that is at the root of the
problem. To place the blame on the card issuer is akin to moralizing
over the crime of shoplifting by putting the retailer at fault for attractive
merchandising efforts and for not stationing armed guards at every isle
[sic]. Each person must accept responsibility for his or her own...
pocketbook.

1220

The John Marshall Law Review

[32:1197

Regardless of whether the credit card industry or the debtor
is to blame, Internet gambling debt will continue even if the government outlaws such gambling. Courts merely assess the intentions of the debtor and do not judge the debtor's actions. Therefore, even if the gambler incurs all his debt from an illegal virtual
casino, the court may discharge the debt as long as the debtor had
intent to repay.
III.

FLIPPING THE SWITCH ON INTERNET CASINOS AND THE

DISCHARGEABILITY OF GAMBLING DEBTS

Currently, it is legal in the United States to enter a virtual
casino to gamble. 17 Internet experts and opponents of the Kyl Bill
view the language as largely unenforceable. Opponents further
cite the possibility of intrusion into the place where
Americans
7
have the greatest expectation of privacy: their homes. 1
Despite the legal status of Internet gambling, eventually,
gambling over the Internet should be prohibited in the United
States. It is important to remember that the future of Internet
gambling legislation is not bound by the current state of such
laws.' 7' Rather, prompt attention
to the matter can affect both the
76
law and its enforceability.

Redrafting the legislation is the first and easiest step in
regulating or prohibiting Internet gambling. 77 Implementing
these drafts will prove to be more difficult.' 78 Because of the complexities of implementing anti-gambling laws on the Internet, no
series of federal laws could create an entirely gambling-free environment. 79 "Prohibition would result in [I]nternet gambling becoming an unregulated industry dominated by persons willing to
violate law in the United States and elsewhere."8 ° The size of the
Internet gambling industry will ultimately depend, however, on
the determination the government makes in enforcing the law.'8'
Considering the possible prohibition of Internet gambling, the
focus shifts to whether the debtor who files for bankruptcy can discharge his credit card gambling debts if that type of gambling is
illegal. An individual cannot have a good faith subjective intent to
repay an illegal transaction. Therefore, a debtor should not be

173. Congress Strips Internet Gaming Prohibition From Final Budget Bill,
INTERAcTIVE GAMING COUNCIL, (Interactive Gaming Council, St. Charles,
M.O.) Oct. 21, 1998.
174. Id.
175. Cabot, supra note 16, at 232.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Cabot, supra note 16, at 232.
181. Id.
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able to discharge credit card debts due to illegal Internet gambling.
However, a court may overlook the illegal transaction and
merely analyze the intent of the debtor. The court in AT&T Universal Card Services Corp. v. Harris held that even though the
debtor used cash advances from his credit card to buy illegal
drugs, the purchase of drugs was irrelevant to the question of
whether Harris intended to repay. 11 The court found that Harris'
debts were dischargeable. 8 The court based its decision on Harris' financial history and Harris' testimony in that he fully intended to repay the debt.'
Despite the persuasive reasoning in Harris, by allowing the
discharge of credit card debts from illegal Internet gambling,
courts would essentially be approving illegal behavior. Courts
should not merely look at a debtor's intent to repay the debt since
an illegal transaction by itself is fraudulent.
Given the easy access to virtual casino sites, the possibility of
Evenaddiction to Internet gambling becomes more prevalent.'
tually, the courts' discharge of illegal credit card Internet gambling debts will cost the consumer. Consumers who use credit
cards will "pick up the tab" by paying higher interest rates and
higher annual fees.18
Congress should not focus on prohibiting Internet gambling.
Instead, Internet gambling should be regulated. 87 Also, credit
182. 210 B.R. 617, 620 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
183. Id.
184. Id. The court looked at the fact that defendant Harris did not exceed
the credit limit on his account. Id. The court reasoned that defendant was not
financially sophisticated and in an unstable financial condition when the
charges were made. Id. Defendant did have a positive work history. Id. In
this case, there was no evidence of actual fraud, and plaintiff failed to meet its
burden of proving that defendant obtained and used the credit card fraudulently. Id.
185. Kratzke & Depperschmidt, supra note 19, at 258.

186. Id.
187. According to Cory Aronovitz, an attorney in Chicago and noted expert in

gaming law issues, "[t]o maintain the gaming environment within cyberspace,
a dedicated effort and the pledge of cooperation is required." Summary Relat-

ing to Dev. of Interactive/InternetGaming Review Board, presented at Internet
Gambling: The First Int'l Symposium on Internet Gambling Law & Management, Nov. 11-13, 1997, Washington D.C. Aronovitz proposes the creation of
the Internet Gaming Review Board (IGB), an independent body that would
have the authority to "fully and effectively administer, regulate and enforce

the system of certification of interactive gambling." Id. Further, the IGB
should have jurisdiction over the following activities.
1. Investigate applicants and determine the suitability of applicants for
certification. The IGB shall have the authority to employ the services of
an investigative consultant.
2. To establish and maintain a website that provides current information relating to certified applicants, actions taken against applicants, in-
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card companies need to complete more thorough background
checks on consumers to prevent issuing credit cards to individuals
who are consistently in debt. A simple check of a credit report can
prevent a debtor from obtaining a new source of money to fund a
possible gambling addiction. With the rapid increase in the number of bankruptcy filings and its link to gambling, it is imperative
that regulations prevent repeated debtors from digging themselves
into a financial hole.
Another solution to relieve consumers from the burden of
gambling bankruptcies is to reform the Bankruptcy Code. The
Court in AT&T Universal CardServices Corp. v. Totina noted:
[t]hat gambling debt should be dischargeable in bankruptcy provokes strong reactions. However this court may feel about the morality of the Bankruptcy Code permitting discharge of such debt,
there is no statutory rule that the use of credit cards to incur gambling debts shows the requisite intent of a debtor not to pay his
debts.... If Congress intended that credit card advances for gambling losses be treated in any different fashion than any other debts
incurred by an honest-albeit, misinformed, and always overly optimistic-debtor, it can always amend the Bankruptcy Code.'88
Currently, two important consumer bankruptcy reform bills
are pending in Congress that if passed, would have a direct effect
on the treatment of gambling debt.'89 The "Bankruptcy Reform Act
formation relating to filing complaints against applicants and any other
information necessary to the effective regulation of Internet gaming.
3. To enter the office or location of gaming operations of applicants or
any other place of business relating to the applicant, where evidence of
compliance relating to IGB rules and regulations are likely to be found.
4. Applicants are required to provide all costs associated with the investigation of its certification.
5. To adopt standards for the certification of applicants, and the games
offered by service providers.
6. To require any and all records to be submitted to the IGB and maintained as proscribed by IGB rules and regulations relating to the business of the applicant.
7. To conduct hearings in accordance with an adopted Administrative
Procedure Act from a competent jurisdiction, issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and subpoenas duces tecum for the production of
documents or other records, and administer oaths and affirmations to
witnesses.
8. To proscribe forms and applications to be issued to applicants for
certification.
9. To revoke or suspend certifications as the IGB sees fit.
10. To prohibit any person from accessing a certified applicants gaming
service.
11. To delegate the execution of any of its powers, and take any other action that may be reasonable or appropriate to enforce the rules and
regulations.
Id.
188. 198 B.R. 673, 681 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1996).
189. Legislative Update, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 1998, at 6.
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of 1998" would provide a "needs-based bankruptcy system" and an
amendment to § 523(a)(2)(C) to create a presumption that consumer debts incurred within ninety days of bankruptcy are nondischargeable. 9 ' Further, the bill also ensures that "debt incurred
when the debtor had no reasonable expectation or ability to repay
are non-dischargeable." 191 Another bill, titled, "Consumer Lenders
and Borrowers Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998" would prohibit claims that "arise from a debt incurred in or adjacent to a
gambling facility or a debt that the creditor knew or should have
known was intended to be used for gambling."'92
CONCLUSION

Internet gambling, credit cards, and the courts' favorable
subjective intent analysis of debtors creates a dangerous combination of elements that increase the number of bankruptcy filings in
a cyclical manner. The credit card companies entice consumers
with pre-approved credit solicitations. Internet gamblers use the
credit cards to fund their participation. The gamblers expend all
their credit on virtual casinos. Courts discharge the Internet
gamblers' debts simply because the debtors swore they meant to
pay back the creditors with their winnings. In this game of roulette, it seems the only winner is the credit card industry, cashing
in on the Internet gambler's bad luck.

190. Id. The bill (H.R. 3150) was introduced on February 3, 1998 by Rep.

George Gekas (R-PA).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 41. Representatives Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) and John Conyers (DM) introduced the bill (H.R. 3146).

